飘扬在世界屋脊上的红旗
摘自美国革命共产党机关报《革命工人报》（1043期，2000年2月20日）
李·沃内斯托（Li.Onesto）
上海红旗 译
在1996年2月13日，随着数千名武装起来的男女群众揭竿而起，尼泊尔的历史从此进入了一个崭新和光荣的阶段。在尼泊尔共产党（毛泽东主义者）（以下简称尼共（毛））的领导下，尼泊尔发动了一场以消灭帝国主义，官僚资本，殖民主义为目的的人民战争。经过3 年的持续革命斗争，已经取得了不小的成绩，并且在尼泊尔大地上深深地扎下了革命的根。由于信息闭塞的原因，这场革命并不为世人所知，为了让全世界进步人民都知道这场发生在世界屋脊上的伟大的人民革命运动，美国《革命工人报》特派记者李·沃内斯托深入尼泊尔境内，跟随尼共（毛）的人民军一起踏遍了整个尼泊尔，随军采访了尼共（毛）的总书记，战士和支持斗争的积极分子以及尼泊尔普通公民。以下就是对尼共（毛）总书记普里昌达（P rachanda）同志的采访纪实。
“我们坚信这场斗争是摧毁数千年来奴役压迫制度的桎梏，建立一个全新的人民民主制度国家的必要的也是唯一的途径，是尼泊尔通向光明未来的光辉大道。”
选自尼共（毛）在1996年2月13日向全国散发的传单
4年前，尼共(毛）在尼泊尔发动了一场崭新的人民革命战争。在斗争开始的前两周，在全国范围内几乎爆发了5000次直接行动。包括武装袭击农村警察署，发动使贫农取得耕地反对封建地主的土地革命，以及严惩了作恶多端的土豪劣绅。这对全世界无产阶级来说是极其鼓舞和振奋人心的。相对于其他第三世界国家来说，尼泊尔革命不得不面对“三座大山”，他们的目的是推翻依附帝国主义的官僚资产阶级统治体系，赶走帝国主义势力，铲除半殖民主义制度。尼共（毛）运用了毛泽东闻名的“持久战”战略。在广大农村建立了革命根据地，并以农村包围城市为指导方针，夺取全国政权，建立起一个新民主主义共和国，并在此基础上逐步走上社会主义道路。他们的斗争也是世界革命的一部分。在最近的四年中，尼泊尔政府采取了反革命的镇压运动--约有超过1 000人被捕和牺牲。但是面对残酷的现实，尼泊尔的革命运动依旧在蓬勃发展，许多贫苦的农民在战斗中锻炼成为一名练习有素的优秀战士。尼泊尔人民军是在游击区内组建的，并深深的扎根于广大人民群众中。非凡是广大劳动妇女，在人民军中扮演了重要的角色。在革命根据地，象在尼泊尔西部的罗尔帕（R olpa)和汝库姆（Rukum）地区，地方反动势力和政府军警被人民军赶走，政府军甚至连日常巡逻都提心吊胆。面对全国风起云涌的人民革命，1 999年尼泊尔大选产生的科腊拉那政府束手无策，地位非常不稳固。记者在访问期间，正是尼共（毛）发动的第四个战略计划如火如荼进行之中，这次战争的目的是扩展根据地范围，发展人民军力量。人民军的作战经验现在已经非常熟练，而且游击区也扩大了。以下就是记者采访尼共（毛）总书记普里昌达
（以下简称普）同志的具体内容。
记者：全世界要求革命的人民都想了解你们在尼泊尔的斗争情况。你是否能介绍一下尼泊尔革命开始时的客观局势？为什么党认为在尼泊尔开展大规模武装革命运动的时机已经成熟？你们斗争中的正确指导方针是如何制定的？为什么你们觉得这种斗争策略有成功的把握？
普:首先，我想从意识形态上来解释一下这个问题。尼泊尔是一个半殖民地半封建的国家。马克思列宁毛泽东主义认为一个被压迫的国家，假如具有半殖民地半封建性质的话，革命的客观形势总的来说，大体已经存在。这是我们从理论基础中得出的结论。并且，通过国内共产主义运动中大量阶级斗争，人民运动和武装斗争的宝贵经验，我们有充分理由相信在尼泊尔进行人民战争的道路是完全正确的。
尼泊尔是个又小又穷的国家。全国有超过85%的人口居住在农村，而且绝大多数人民生活贫困，受压迫程度深。非凡是根深蒂固的封建生产关系，尤其是封建剥削制度，在农村中很盛行。而尼泊尔的工业化程度很低，即便是那些仅有的工业基础也是把握在依附于印度垄断大资本的买办阶级手中。因此我国的阶级矛盾非常尖锐，人民为了自身的独立发展，为了生活幸福而始终长期不懈斗争着。但是由于斗争中缺乏正确的革命理论领导，更由于国内共产主义运动中的修正主义路线以及党的上层领导危机。因此每次革命斗争高潮到来后的结果，往往都是上层领导破坏群众革命运动，向统治阶级妥协，向党内修正主义者让步。
在这里我不得不提及发生在尼泊尔历史上的一件事。1815年，尼泊尔和英属印度军队发生了一场大规模的战争。虽然最终尼泊尔以失败而告终，但尼泊尔人民在这场反侵略战争中表现出了英雄勇敢的反抗精神。非凡值得一提的是，在这场武装斗争中，人民武装力量充分利用了各种各样的游击战术。成千上万的群众包括妇女和老人都纷纷拿起武器英勇的同侵略者作斗争。这场战争持续了很久，人民反抗力量在许多地方重创了侵略军。但是，以封建君主为首的尼泊尔上层统治阶级却最终向侵略者投了降。
最后，尼泊尔被迫签署了丧权辱国的《苏格里协议》。许多原属于尼泊尔的领土被划入了印度的版图内。从此，尼泊尔沦为了一个半殖民地，半封建的国家。而当英国人离开印度后，尼泊尔则又沦为了印度民族扩张主义下的一块殖民地。近百年来尼泊尔人民始终生活在水深火热之中。
1949年，在伟大的中国革命胜利和苏联社会主义建设取得巨大成绩的鼓舞下，尼泊尔共产党成立了。
记者：中国革命的胜利是促使尼泊尔共产党成立的主要因素嘛？
普:是的，非常巨大的因素。而且，与此同时在印度，爆发了一场大规模的农民武装暴动。在这样的大环境下，尼泊尔共产党诞生了。党开始的工作重心在广大农村，而且在党成立3 到4年后，终于出现了一场农民革命运动的高潮。但是，运动的领导层我们党的总书记却向国王妥协，放弃了武装革命道路，并向政府保证以后只进行“和平运动”。从此，党的整个领导层向修正主义道路靠拢。而以后在尼泊尔发生的多次武装革命运动，都被修正主义路线出卖了。每次修正主义路线葬送人民革命运动都是党内部意识形态斗争的结果。
毛泽东同志在中国发动的无产阶级文化大革命也直接影响了尼泊尔，文化大革命深深鼓舞了青年共产主义者和广大群众。同时，我们也受到了印度纳萨尔派（印度主张通过农民武装斗争夺取政权的共产党人）革命运动的激励。这些原因促使在加帕（J hapa）地区的青年共产党人首先发动了一场反对党内修正主义路线的斗争，这就是以后重新建党进程的发端。与此同时，尼共的四大开幕，会议主要讨论了在尼泊尔开展武装斗争问题的议程。但是在重新组党和如何领导群众发动起义的问题上我们的政治路线还是不明朗。这个重大的意识形态和政治问题在文化大革命结束后争论了1 0年。我们党现在的领导层产生都是这场意识形态斗争的最终结果。
就在同一时刻，在我们党内还存在一场重大的两条路线的斗争。第一次是和拉马（Lama）派的斗争，我们果断与之右倾道路进行了不懈斗争。第二次是与达姆（D umdum)派以及M.B.辛（M.B. Singh）的折衷主义道路进行斗争。M.B.辛最终分裂了党，自己组建了一个修正主义的党。这些修正主义者始终以所谓的“折衷”性的“中派”自居，我们果断的和他们进行了斗争。而我们的正确路线是最终在同修正主义路线的斗争和人民战争中发展起来的。在与M .B.辛的斗争中，我们进一步阐明了马克思列宁毛泽东主义的正确观点。
记者：你所说的这些事具体发生在什么年代？
普:是1986年，那年我们最终把马克思列宁毛泽东主义作为了我们党的指导思想。而在此之前，只有秘鲁共产党这样阐述过。我们也读了一些来自秘鲁共产党的文件材料。在这个问题上我们党内也争论了4 到5年，争论焦点在于：为什么说是毛泽东思想？为什么不是毛泽东主义？最终经过一年的商榷，我们党采纳了马克思列宁毛泽东主义的意识形态。这不仅仅是一个术语的变化，这是我们正确理解毛泽东的理论贡献的结果。我们以此重新阐述了人民战争，政治和军事路线的观点。与此同时，尼泊尔的阶级斗争发展形势，斗争环境的成熟以及党内两条路线斗争的不断深入，使我们看到了在尼泊尔发动人民战争的客观和主观条件的成熟。
在你所提的关于革命主客观因素的问题上，我想说的是按照马克思列宁毛泽东主义的观点，一个受压迫国家的革命客观形势往往总是在一个或部分地区先成熟起来的。一个国家的革命道路是不平坦的。所以，只要这个国家的任何地区可以发动武装斗争并且能够持续发展，从总体上来说，客观革命形势已经成熟。对被压迫的国家来说，主观上的预备是最重要的问题，而理论问题就是最重要的主观因素。这就牵涉到一个党，一个革命的共产党，是不是用马克思列宁毛泽东主义武装思想的要害问题。我们也可以这样说，在这一方面，具备革命主客观条件国家的首要问题就是如何战胜修正主义，重建一个以马克思列宁毛泽东主义武装思想的政党。这是这些国家必须得以解决的思想理论问题。
而帝国主义国家就往往不是这样了。帝国主义国家的理论问题不是革命的主观因素。理论因素决定的斗争战术和路线也不是主观因素。客观上说，由于帝国主义国家对第三世界一切被压迫国家的残酷剥削和控制，因此，帝国主义国家革命的主要重点是不断揭露整个体系的黑暗面，那里的党应该做好革命的各方面预备，并且要有意识地去推动和制造革命形势。一旦革命的客观形势发展到成熟时，就可以轻而易举使之总爆发。我们想这条革命道路应该能适用于帝国主义国家。
象尼泊尔这样的半殖民地半封建国家，有超过85%的人口生活在农村地区，而现代技术工人和无产者工人的人数是非常有限的。有些人说，在象尼泊尔这样的国家中革命形势是不成熟的。就像我国的修正主义者们总是说，尼泊尔没有客观革命形势。他们还说，尼的主观革命条件还不足以开展武装斗争。我们谴责这种观点。修正主义说的不是事实。对于象尼泊尔这种类型的国家来说，主观理论上的预备才是最主要的问题。我们就是基于上述观点来看待尼泊尔革命的形势。
在斗争的初始阶段，我们必须设法熟悉尼泊尔的整部历史和具体国情：主流思想文化是什么？群众的思想状况是什么？整个社会关系是什么？各派政治力量的具体情况是什么？阶级状况又是什么？这是我们在斗争前所作的最后理论预备。在调查研究中，我们发现了尼泊尔革命的一些非凡的性质。尽管尼泊尔是一个小国，但从另一方面上来说它却并不小。从地理上来说，你可以依靠现代化的交通工具在一两天内到达印度全国范围内的任何一个角落。但是在尼泊尔，你却不得不步行许多日子才能到达。我想你应该明白这个道理，这里比美国还遥远。
记者：对的，我已经从中直接得到了许多经验。
普:所以，虽然尼泊尔是个小国，但是这里的山区地形却十分有利于开展游击战，发动人民战争。我们更应该看到的是尼泊尔上层阶级长达2 00年的反动专制统治已经促使全国形成了一股巨大的反抗浪潮。而这个专制政府严密控制的暴力统治机器以加德满都为中心，遍布了全国每个角落。在长期的反抗斗争中，群众阶级运动以燎原之势在整个尼泊尔遍地开花。我们相信不久的将来，全体尼泊尔人民都会卷入这场伟大的运动中。
尼泊尔的东部，西部和南部都与印度接壤，北部与中国的西藏以西马拉雅山脉为界。在尼泊尔的整个南部地区从东至西是一个广阔的特莱平原。全国的大部分耕地和森林都分布在那里。而整个北部地区却是山区，那里的居住人数超过了尼泊尔总人口的半数。非凡是西马拉雅山脉的南麓地区天气十分严寒。从以上的这些地理状况分析来看，我们认为尼泊尔不是一个“小国”。
我们还仔细研究了尼泊尔的民族问题。尼泊尔是一个多民族的国家，全国两千万人口中有20到25个被压迫的民族。这些民族有自己的语言和宗教。这也是尼泊尔国情的非凡情况。我们研究了所有这些问题，批判了修正主义和资产阶级政府的民族政策，最后得出的结论是给予这些被压迫民族以自治权。现在，民族自治已经写进了我们的党纲。
我们也研究了尼泊尔的主观革命形势。我们的运动现在遍布全国的东部，中部和西部地区。西部地区从历史，地理和文化角度来看更适于革命根据地的发展，更重要的是那里的人民受统治阶级压迫比较深，又远离加德满都的中心政府，所以是革命的重点地区。
记者：是否能具体阐述一下西部地区作为革命重点的物质条
件上的基础嘛？
普:最主要的是统治阶级忽视了西部的经济发展。
记者：为什么？
普:第一个原因是他们认为在西部投资无利可图。其次是由于统治阶级的民族歧视政策，以及强烈的社会等级制观念，而西部居住着许多少数民族。另外很重要的一点是历史原因，在1 8世纪末，现在的西部地区并不完全处于中心政权的管辖统治之下。后来，当这块地区逐步自东向西并入尼泊尔时，中心政府并没有完全取得绝对统治，而是与地方政府达成妥协，给予了他们的一定自治的权力。所以说西部地区并没有被统治阶级完全控制，中心政府的政令对西部地区人民影响不大。西部地区的居民属于蒙古人种，所以你会觉得看上去有点像中国人。那里的人们都是非常忠诚和勇敢的战士，这也是西部历史文化的传统精神。最后要害的一点是等级观念和封建传统制度在那里人民中的影响比较弱。
记者：是不是封建传统制度在尼泊尔的被压迫民族中影响都比较弱？
普:是的。不过，实际上，当你到东部和中部地区去时，你就会觉得那里的封建制度影响程度非常深。
记者：但是在罗尔帕和汝库姆地区我不大看到庙宇啊。
普:确实，那里的庙宇不多。由于在那里居住的一些民族传统中保留着原始的家庭民主制，这已经是那里人们根深蒂固的观念了，甚至连封建父权制在那里影响也不大。同时，由于我们党长期在那里工作斗争，在一定程度上也提高了当地人民的思想觉悟。
记者：修正主义在西部地区的影响是不是很弱？
普:非常弱。我们党正确路线在西部地区的果断贯彻执行，使修正主义没有一点市场，革命的趋势在那里不可阻挡。当然这里还包含着其它一些原因，譬如说，交通不方便，缺乏电力，以及通讯设施不完善等等这些都不利于中心政府的统治。而恰恰是这些因素使我们更加有理由相信这里是发动人民战争的主战场。当然我们并不是说要把人民战争仅仅局限于西部地区，因为那往往会有利于拥有强大军事力量的统治阶级对我们革命的扼杀。
我们看到了在全国发动群众革命运动的主观有利形势。我们在全国范围内都有自己的组织。因此我们最终决定应该在全国各地同时发动人民战争，并且主要集中在东部，中部和西部地区以及首都地区。城市也是我们的另一个工作重点，但不是武装斗争，而是一些革命的宣传工作。另外，我们也应该在印度开展工作，因为那里生活着7 百多万尼泊尔人，印度也是我们开展运动的重点地区。我们为人民战争制定了一个计划，由于尼泊尔的形势不完全等同于菲律宾，土耳其，秘鲁以及其它展开人民战争的国家和地区，因此这个计划有着我们本国革命的特点。虽说我们的计划同秘鲁共产党人的斗争计划有某些相似之处，但还是有不同之处。秘鲁共产党人是在选举站四周地区发动运动的，他们袭击全国每一个选举站。但是我们在计划第一阶段，数千名战士是在全国各个主要地区发动运动的。这也是我们通过对尼泊尔历史，地理和文化形势的仔细研究，最终决定走上这条道路的。
在尼泊尔，有超过全国总人口数72%的人民生活在贫困线以下。这是一个非常严重的形势。我们总是向广大人民宣传：多党制并不会给你们带来什么幸福，那是帝国主义和封建主义的骗人把戏。在三、四年后的今天，群众终于明白了：“是的，毛泽东主义者们说的完全对！”就在我们发动运动之前，我们曾经组织过一次有数千名群众参加的民主大会，我们在大会上公布我们即将进行一场人民战争，但是统治阶级却不以为然地说：“那些人仅仅是说说而已。”
记者：我读过你的一些著作，你认为为了发动人民战争应该在意识形态，政治和军事路线上与修正主义进行决裂。这是一个对全世界的共产党人来说极其重要的问题。这也是区分修正主义和马克思列宁毛泽东主义的要害。这个问题的解决是党内为发动人民战争而对意识形态，政治和军事路线进行的一场必要的变革。你能不能谈谈你们党是不是也曾进行过类似的变革以发动人民战争？
普:这个问题你提的非常重要。首先，这个观点是我们党根据马克思列宁毛泽东主义基本原理的具体理解后提出的。有些人认为事物发展是个演化的过程，一个不间断的发展，是进化的过程。但是我们不同意这种观点，这不是科学的分析。毛泽东主义认为事物发展的真正过程是不持续的，是有矛盾性的。一切事物，包括人类历史和社会，人类的思想这些发展过程都是矛盾斗争性的结果。我们在发动人民战争前恰恰抓住了这个理论上的要害。
记者：你说过要进行一场飞跃。
普:对的，进行一场飞跃。在我们党内，对于每一个同志来说，飞跃才是思想上的一个要害问题。修正主义的党以及他们的领导人总是教育人民说，要害问题是改良，改良，再改良。改良就是改良主义，就是修正主义。但我们认为飞跃才是最终的革命。
我们谴责修正主义是庸俗的“进化论”。我们要求革命，而革命就是不断摧毁旧制度，就是思想上的飞跃。在运动开始前，我们在这个问题上有过很大的争论。当我们的指导思想从“马克思列宁主义，毛泽东思想”转变为“马克思列宁毛泽东主义”时，我们党内争论就是达到了这样一个思想上质的飞跃作用。毛泽东认为人对事物的熟悉分为两阶段，第一阶段是从实践中得到感性熟悉，而在整个熟悉过程中起要害的是在第二阶段，即感性熟悉在人脑中应起突变（飞跃），最终得到符合逻辑的概念结论。我们尽力用毛泽东关于熟悉的二阶理论观点教育全党。同时，这也是我们对马克思列宁毛泽东主义更进一步的深刻熟悉。而在此之前，有些错误观点认为马克思列宁毛泽东主义也是改良和渐进主义的一种。但当我们重新阐明了这个问题后，我们党内又有了新熟悉，新信心，新气象。
当我们草拟了运动的发动计划后，党内又爆发了一场关于如何开展人民战争的争论。与此同时，我们也间接地参与了国会选举活动，有11 名党员进入了国会。9名在众议院，2名在上议院。这在我们党内引起了强烈反应。这也是右倾势力对我们的一次大的挑战。为了使党的思想再一次飞跃，我们同修正主义，小资产阶级机会主义以及种种右倾思潮做了果断的斗争。关于许多同志是否公开身份进行工作的问题上，我强调了以下几个观点。我们1 1名进入国会工作的同志可以公开身份，而我们主要的政治局委员以及地方和地区上的领导同志绝不能公开身份。除了负责国会工作的机构外，其它党的组织一律转入地下。
由于我们党长期受到“和平主义”，议会道路，机会主义等等这些小资产阶级思潮影响，在运动开始时，党内有人提出先进行一些小规模的武装斗争做“实验”，看看统治当局的反应，而不要一开始就公布发动人民战争。我们反驳道：“这是革命嘛？这也是改良主义，而且是一种阴谋路线。革命武装斗争不是阴谋。革命斗争是公开的，正大光明的；而阴谋主义不是真正的革命。”还有些人提出在进行人民战争的同时，还要积极开展国会中的斗争，使国会斗争不受人民战争的影响。他们还声称国会斗争可以有助于人民战争的深入开展。这部分人在后来运动开始后，要求我们在斗争中退缩。我可以用一句话概括他们的逻辑：“我们可以开展人民战争，但是除了罗尔帕和汝库姆地区以及在那些我们有可能在议会选举中获胜的地方，因为议会斗争中的胜利会有助于我们进行人民战争。”我们也谴责了这种观点逻辑，我们认为这也不符合马克思列宁毛泽东主义。
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Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World
Inside the Revolution in Nepal:
Interview with Comrade Prachanda
RW reporter Li Onesto interviews Comrade Prachanda, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Revolutionary Worker #1043, February 20, 2000
"We are fully conscious that this war to break the shackles of thousands of years of slavery and to establish a New Democratic state will be quite uphill, full of twists and turns and of a protracted nature. But this and this alone is the path of people’<$>s liberation and a great and bright future.”
From the leaflet distributed by the CPN (Maoist),
in hundreds of thousands of copies, all over Nepal
on February 13, 1996
Four years ago, on February 13, 1996, a new people’s war was initiated in Nepal under the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). In the first two weeks, almost 5,000 actions were carried out throughout the country — including armed assaults on police stations in rural districts, confiscation of property from oppressive landlords, and punishment of local tyrants. This was truly an inspiring and significant development in the world and for the international proletariat. As in other Third World countries, the revolutionaries in Nepal must confront “three mountains” to achieve liberation: Their goals are to overthrow the bureaucrat-capitalist class and state system, which are dependent on and serve imperialism; uproot semi-feudalism; and drive out imperialism. To do this, the CPN (Maoist) is applying Mao’s strategy of a protracted people’s war — establishing base areas in the countryside and aiming to surround the cities, seize nationwide power, and establish a new democratic republic as a step toward building a new socialist society. Their struggle is part of the world proletarian revolution. For the last four years, the government of Nepal has carried out vicious counter-revolutionary campaigns against the People’s War — over 1,000 people have already been killed and many more have been arrested, jailed, and tortured. But in the face of this, the revolution has continued to advance and grow. The People’s War in Nepal has advanced from primitive fighter groups to disciplined and trained squads and platoons. The people’s army has established guerrilla zones and is sinking deep roots among the people. Women continue to play a major role as fighters in the people’s army. And in areas where the People’s War is the strongest — like the Rolpa and Rukum districts in the West — local reactionaries have run away and the police stay away, afraid to patrol. Elected in May 1999, the government of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai has been unstable and fraught with in-fighting over how to deal with the insurgency. In the spring of 1999, RW reporter Li Onesto traveled throughout Nepal with the people’s army — meeting and talking with party leaders, guerrillas, activists in mass organizations and villagers. At that time, the CPN (Maoist) was in the process of leading the people to carry out their fourth military plan, aimed at establishing base areas and exercising new people’s power. Military actions by the guerrillas were becoming larger and more sophisticated. The following interview with Comrade Prachanda, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), was conducted during Li Onesto’s trip.
Li Onesto, Revolutionary Worker: There are revolutionary people all over the world who want to hear about the People's War in Nepal. So it would be of great interest if you could give a basic picture of the objective situation and what the material basis in Nepal is for initiating People's War. Why does the party think it is possible to wage protracted People's War, to organize the masses through armed struggle? Why is this the correct strategy given the situation in Nepal? And why does the party feel it is possible to win with this strategy?
Comrade Prachanda: First of all, I want to explain this question in ideological terms. Nepal is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. And MLM (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) says that in oppressed countries like this, semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries, in general, a revolutionary objective situation prevails. This is the ideological basis from where we started to study the concrete situation, because the main thing is ideological clarity. And through the course of class struggle, mass movements, mass struggle, and mainly the ideological struggle inside the communist movement, we came to the conclusion that a situation prevails for initiating the People's War.
We see that Nepal is a small and poor country. More than 85 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, and the people are very poor-they are very oppressed. The feudal relations-the feudal forms of exploitation-are very severe in the rural areas. Industrial development is very poor, and the kinds of industrial bases that are there are all in the hands of a comprador bourgeois class-mainly the Indian expansionist bourgeoisie. Therefore, there are sharp class distinctions, and people have been struggling for reforms, for independence, and for the livelihood of the people, for a long time. There has been continuous mass struggle. But due to the lack of revolutionary leadership, due to revisionism in the communist movement, due to a crisis of leadership: every time when there has been mass struggle, this leadership has been able to confuse the masses, to make compromises with the ruling classes and to get some concessions for this revisionist group.
I want to mention that in 1815 there was a big struggle with British India. Nepalese people fought heroically against British India but ultimately they did not succeed-they failed. This was armed struggle, this war with British India, and people participated in this war in different ways. Different kinds of guerrilla warfare were used. And, in that war, the British ruling class saw that the Nepalese people were very heroic and brave-and that they fought heroically against British India. For more than one year they fought and fought, and in many places they defeated the British army. Hundreds and hundreds of masses, including women and old men, all fought in that war. But the Nepalese ruling class, mainly the monarchy, the king, surrendered to India.
There was a negotiation in Sugali, and they made a compromise. And after that, more Nepalese territory was taken by India. Before this, geographically, Nepal was more or less three times larger. But all this land was taken by India with the Sugali Treaty. From that very point Nepal became a semi-colonial country, and when the British left India, Nepal became a semi-colony of Indian expansionism. After that, there came the Rana government clique, and the great comrade Karl Marx called this Jang Bahadur Rana a British puppet and dog. People suffered very much from different kinds of oppression and exploitation, and from that point, Nepal changed to a semi-feudal country.
In 1949 when the Nepalese Communist Party was established, it was a great and far-reaching historical event. That party was established when the great Chinese revolution had been won and socialism was developing in the USSR.
RW: Was the victory of the Chinese revolution a big factor in the establishment of the Communist Party in Nepal?
Prachanda: Yes, a very big factor. And there was also, at the time, a very big armed struggle of the peasants in India. This was the surrounding larger revolutionary situation at the time when the Communist Party in Nepal was established. The party started to work among the basic peasant masses, and for three or four years, there was a big peasant movement-a kind of revolutionary upsurge. But, at the same time, the leadership of the party changed and took a revisionist stand. And the leadership of the movement, the general secretary at the time, appealed to the king, saying we will do all our work peacefully, therefore please regard our party like this. And the party leadership totally went revisionist. After that there were so many mass struggles, mass movements. But every time, this revisionist clique confused people, made compromises with the ruling class, and betrayed the masses. Every time they betrayed the masses. And at the same time there was also ideological struggle going on inside the movement.
Then, when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was initiated in China under the leadership of great comrade Mao, it directly impacted on the revolution in Nepal. There were so many materials from the Chinese Cultural Revolution that came to Nepal. This Cultural Revolution inspired mainly the younger generation of communists and the masses. And at the same time young people in the communist movement were also inspired by the Naxalite Movement in India. This inspired young people in the Jhapa District and provoked a kind of rebellion against the revisionist leadership; and there was a process of reconstitution of the party. At the same time the Fourth Party Congress was held, and it also put the question of armed struggle on the agenda. But a fully developed political line was still not clear-of how to reorganize a new kind of party and explain to the masses the need to rebel. There was a big ideological and political debate for 10 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and all our leadership team is a product of that ideological struggle.
And at the same time, inside our party, there was a big two-line struggle, first with this Lama clique, because a rightist tendency was there. We fought vigorously with that line. Later on we fought with this Dumdum line, M.B. Singh's line, because it was eclecticism and rightism and very much muddle-headed. Individually M.B. Singh was established as a leader, but his line was totally revisionist, and it was so confusing, covered with eclectic words. We fought with that line, and, when we fought with that line, we developed the correct line which is now leading the people and the People's War. We came to an understanding from that struggle with Dumdum (M.B. Singh), and we defined our ideology as Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
RW: What year is this now you're talking about?
Prachanda: It was 1986, I think, when we finalized Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as our ideology. At the time, only the Communist Party of Peru had said this, and we had some documents from the PCP. But on that question, already for four or five years, there had been some discussion about: Why Mao Tsetung Thought? Why not Maoism? That kind of discussion had been going on inside our party. We had a debate for one year to change this terminology and then the whole party adopted Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as our ideology. It was not only a change of terminology, it was our understanding of Mao's contribution. We also defined the People's War and our military line, our political line. And this is our ideological, political, subjective basis. At the same time, class struggle was developing, and, in the circumstances of that class struggle and the two-line struggle, we were able to see the objective and subjective situation to initiate the People's War.
On your question about the relationship between objective and subjective factors, I want to say that in oppressed countries, according to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, a revolutionary objective situation generally prevails in one or another part of the country. The developing process of this country is uneven. Therefore, in any part of the country there is the possibility of initiating armed struggle and then sustaining and developing the struggle. In general, as a whole, you can say that an objective revolutionary situation prevails. In oppressed countries, the question is the subjective preparation-the main question, the principal factor is subjective. And subjective means the communist party, the revolutionary communist party, armed with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. We can also say, in this way, that the main question in these types of countries is how to fight against revisionism and build a new type of party armed with MLM. This is the principal question in these countries.
In imperialist countries this is not the case. In the imperialist countries, the principal question is not the subjective factor. The principal factor deciding tactics and line is objective. Objectively the imperialist countries suck the blood of the oppressed countries and control them. Therefore, the main question for revolutionaries in those imperialist countries is to continuously expose the whole system and build the party and make continuous preparation and consciously try to make the objective situation a revolutionary one-and when a revolutionary objective situation develops, at that time, deal a big blow. We think this kind of line should be applied there.
But the strategy is different in semi-feudal, semi-colonial countries like Nepal, where more than 80 to 85 percent of the population live in the rural areas, whose developing process is uneven, where the modern workers, proletarian workers, are very limited. Some people say a revolutionary objective situation does not prevail in these types of countries. Just like in our country, the revisionists always say the objective situation is not there, and they also say the subjective situation is not there to start the armed struggle. They always say this, and we condemn this line. This is not a fact. In these types of countries the question is subjective preparation. It was in this way that we looked at the conditions for initiating People's War.
And at the time of initiation, we tried to figure out the whole history of Nepal. What is the cultural standard, the cultural level of the masses, what are the economic conditions, what are the social relations, what are the forces, what is the class analysis? We did all these things before this last final preparation. And at that time we found some specific characteristics of the situation in Nepal. Although Nepal is a small country, we think, in another sense it is not a small country. Geographically when you look at the whole country of India you can travel in one or two days to every part and corner. But in Nepal you have to walk up and down for many days-I know you understand this. It is more remote than America.
RW: Yes, I have some direct experience with this!
Prachanda: Therefore, while Nepal is a small country, the mountainous region is very favorable for guerrilla warfare, for People's War. And we also saw that because there has been a centralized reactionary government for more than 200 years there has also been a tendency for the masses to resist throughout all of Nepal. The centralized government has its guns and control everywhere-controlled from Kathmandu. And in the long process of resistance and struggle, the Nepalese masses have developed a kind of situation where-from east to west, from north to south-everywhere there is mass, class struggle. So we saw a situation in which if we call for a program of resistance, of mass movement, then all of Nepal will engage in that movement.
We also looked at the fact that we are surrounded on three sides by this big Indian country. On the east, the west, the south, there is India. And on the north side, there is China. On the north side it is very difficult to come and go. The Himalayan Range is there. There are some places where people can go to and from Tibet, but in general it is not like it is with India. We also analyzed this situation.
We also found that Nepal is again a big country because there are so many nationalities. The population is only 20 million, but there are, more or less, 20 to 25 different oppressed nationalities. There are different languages, there are different religions. And this is also a particularity of the Nepalese situation. We studied all these questions and how to solve the nationality question. We fundamentally depart from all the revisionist and bourgeois parties. We uphold the right of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities, and, for now, in our concrete situation, we say that autonomy should be the program. We express this and explain this as a specific situation in our movement.
And in the Terai region-again you can say Nepal is "big" because you can see that in the southern part from east to west there is plains land, Terai land, which is more or less 300 meters from sea level. It is a big plain, a big agrarian area, with big forests. There is also the mountainous region, where there are big mountains-this is where you traveled, so you know exactly about this. And the majority of the population live in these mountainous areas and the big Himalayan Range, which is very cold. In this way you can also say Nepal is a big country, not a small country. We studied these geographical conditions.
And we also studied our subjective organizational situation. We were in the Eastern Region, we were in the Central and Middle Region, and we were also in the Western Region. The West is historically, geographically, and culturally the basin of the revolution. It is the main point for the revolution-the people here are more oppressed by the ruling classes, and the government in Kathmandu is very far from there.
RW: What is the material basis for the revolution being more advanced in the West? Is the question of the oppressed nationalities a big factor?
Prachanda: Yes, and one thing is that economically the ruling class always neglects the development of the West.
RW: Why?
Prachanda: Because they think that to invest there will not be profitable. This is one factor we can see. And the other is that there are mainly oppressed nationalities there in the West and the ruling class is hegemonistic, chauvinistic-upper caste chauvinistic. Therefore they neglect and oppress these nationalities.
And the other thing is that in the time of making this country, before 1800, in the last part of the 18th century, at that time, this part of the country was not totally captured by the central government. There was a kind of compromise. With the Gorkha empire, this part of the country was captured later on. First they took the east side, later on they went on the west side. The main point here is not first or later. The main point is that those areas were not totally captured. The local authorities had some power and the central authorities had some power. In this way these areas had some kind of autonomy at that time.
So the masses of the Western Region were not so much in the control of the ruling government. And they did not care what the government did and didn't do. This is another historical fact about the West. And in western Nepal there are the Mongolian ethnic groups-you saw how all our comrades there look Chinese. These nationalities are so sincere and such brave fighters-historically they have had this kind of culture. And upper caste chauvinism and feudal ties do not prevail in these nationalities.
RW: You're saying feudal traditions are weaker among these oppressed nationalities?
Prachanda: Yes, weaker. Really. When you went to the Middle Region or the Eastern Region you saw that feudal traditions are very strong.
RW: But when I was in Rolpa and Rukum I didn't see any temples.
Prachanda: Yes, in Rolpa and Rukum there are not too many temples, and in the family background in these nationalities, there is a kind of democracy, a primitive democracy. Even male domination in these places is weaker-it is not like in the dominating castes. And at the same time, our party has a long history of working in these areas, like in Thabang and Rolpa.
RW: And the revisionists in these areas are weaker?
Prachanda: Very weak. And there has been a continuation of consistent revolutionary leadership there. The revisionist influence in that area has always been weak, and the revolutionary tendency has prevailed. There are all these factors. Geographically, there are no transportation facilities, there is no electricity, and communication is also very weak for the ruling classes. All these factors led us to the conclusion that the West is the main region for the People's War. But we also saw that we cannot initiate the People's War only in the western part, because the ruling class is very powerful. They have a powerful army, powerful communication system, and all these things. Therefore if we initiated armed struggle only in the western part, then the government would centralize all their forces and crush us.
Subjectively we also saw a favorable situation for developing mass movements all over the country. And we had organization throughout the whole country. Therefore we finalized that we should initiate People's War from different parts of the country. We should centralize in mainly three areas-East, Middle, West-and the capital. Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for propaganda and such things. And one other area where we should concentrate work is in India, because more than seven million Nepalese live in India. Therefore India should be the other point where we should make efforts to resist the ruling classes. In this way we made a plan. These are the specificities we saw in Nepal. We did not see the exact same situation and plan for initiating the armed struggle as in the Philippines, Peru, Turkey, and other countries where there is some kind of People's War. There are more similarities with the PCP in Peru, but not exactly. They initiated from one election booth, they attacked one election booth. But we initiated from different parts of the country-with thousands of actions in the first plan. When we studied in detail the historical, geographical, and cultural situation in Nepal, we came to the conclusion that we should initiate the People's War in this way.
More than 72 percent of the Nepalese people live below the poverty line. This is a grave situation. We have always explained to the people that nothing can be achieved from this multi-party system-that it is fake, it is imperialist, it is feudal. Therefore after three, four years, the masses saw that, "Yeah, what the Maoists have been saying is really correct." These kinds of sentiments prevailed. Just before the initiation we organized so many big mass demonstrations and mass meetings. Thousands and thousands of masses participated. We had already declared we are going to initiate the People's War. But the ruling class didn't believe it and thought, "These people are talking, only talking."
RW: In some of your writings you've talked about how the party had to make a big rupture-ideologically, politically and militarily-in order to initiate the People's War. This is a very big question for parties around the world, and it is a dividing line between revisionism and MLM-the question of actually carrying out the necessary ideological, political and organizational changes in the party, to initiate the armed struggle. So could you talk about the kind of ruptures your party had to make to initiate the People's War?
Prachanda: These are very serious, important questions you have raised. The question of rupture is a question of making a breakthrough. First of all there is the question of understanding our ideology, which means Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. How does Maoism explain or define this rupture, this developing process? Some people see a process of evolution, a process of continuous development, an evolutionary process. But Marxism-Leninism-Maoism teaches that this is not the case, this is not the scientific case, scientific analysis. The real process of development is breaking with continuation and making a rupture. Everything in nature, in human history and society, in human thinking-the process of development-is the process of breaking with continuation. We came to grasp this question very seriously before the initiation.
RW: You're talking about making a leap.
Prachanda: Yes, making a leap. At one point in our party, for every comrade, on the lip of every comrade was the question of leap, leap-we have to make a leap. We made this question of making a leap very sharp, that we have to make the leap. The revisionist parties and revisionist leaders always teach the people the question of reform, reform, reform. And reform is reformism, is revisionism. But the question of making leaps is revolutionary.
We condemn all the revisionist cliques as vulgar evolutionarism. We are revolutionary, and revolution means breaking with continuation and the question of making leaps. Before the initiation, we had a big debate on these questions. When we changed our terminology from "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought" to "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," at that point, we had a big debate inside the party on this question of leap. And we came to an understanding. Mao said in the theory of knowledge that there is a two-stage theory-the stage of sense or perception and the stage of logical conclusion. We tried to educate the whole party in Mao's theory of knowledge, this two-stage theory. And this gave us a new understanding of MLM. Before that, there was some kind of thinking that MLM meant different kinds of reforms and gradualism. But when we defined this question in this new way, then new feelings, new confidence, a new situation developed inside the party. There was a struggle with rightist tendencies at that time, and we fought, mainly with rightists, revisionism.
Then, when the plan for initiation was drawn up, there was another debate over questions of how to initiate People's War. Our party was so much influenced by rightist tendencies. At the same time, we had indirectly participated in the elections, and we had 11 members in the parliament, nine in the lower house and two in the upper house. And that also had a big influence inside our party circles-the rightist influence was there. That was a big challenge for our party, how to make a leap. The party was so much encircled by rightist revisionism, petty bourgeois tendencies, all these things. And many people were working openly. Although I want to mention and give more stress to the fact that our main leadership team was not working openly at that time. There were our MPs (members in the parliament) who were public. But our main PBMs (polit-bureau members) and comrades and main regional leaders and main district leaders were not open, they were underground. There was parliamentary work but the main party organizational mechanism was underground at that time-you should note this.
So in making the plan for initiation there was great debate over how to go to the armed struggle because many people were influenced by "peaceful" struggle, work in the parliament, rightist and petty bourgeois feelings, and a long tradition of the reformist movement. Then we said that the only process must be a big push, big leap. Not gradual change. There was some thinking from different people in the party that first we should do some actions without declaring the People's War, and then see what happens. This kind of thinking was also there among some people. And we discussed, is this the process? And we said-no, this is not revolutionary, this is also reformism. It is a conspiratorial approach. And armed struggle is not a conspiracy, People's War is not a conspiracy-it is open, politically open and declared openly. This conspiracy theory will not work, and it is also not revolutionary. Doing one action then saying, "OK, let's see what will happen." Then doing another action... No, nothing will work like this.
There was also some thinking that we could start armed struggle in different parts of the country but not say we had initiated the war-and then later on, when we see how the situation develops, we could declare People's War. This kind of logic was also there. And some sections wanted to initiate the war but wanted to still participate in the parliamentary system in an independent way. They argued that some people should still be in the parliament, that it would "help." Later, some of these types of people didn't exactly degenerate but politically retreated after the initiation. They had the logic that, "OK, we will initiate People's War, but in the main region, in Rolpa, Rukum, four MPs should be in parliament because we can win there and this will give strength to the People's War." That kind of logic was also there. And we condemned all this logic and, said, no, this is not Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
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