在1996年2月13日，随着数千名武装起来的男女群众揭竿而起，尼泊尔的历史从此进入了一个崭新和光荣的阶段。在尼泊尔共产党（毛泽东主义者）（以下简称尼共（毛））的领导下，尼泊尔发动了一场以消灭帝国主义，官僚资本，殖民主义为目的的人民战争。经过3 年的持续革命斗争，已经取得了不小的成绩，并且在尼泊尔大地上深深地扎下了革命的根。由于信息闭塞的原因，这场革命并不为世人所知，为了让全世界进步人民都知道这场发生在世界屋脊上的伟大的人民革命运动，美国《革命工人报》特派记者李·沃内斯托深入尼泊尔境内，跟随尼共（毛）的人民军一起踏遍了整个尼泊尔，随军采访了尼共（毛）的总书记，战士和支持斗争的积极分子以及尼泊尔普通公民。以下就是对尼共（毛）总书记普里昌达（P rachanda）同志的采访纪实。
4年前，尼共(毛）在尼泊尔发动了一场崭新的人民革命战争。在斗争开始的前两周，在全国范围内几乎爆发了5000次直接行动。包括武装袭击农村警察署，发动使贫农取得耕地反对封建地主的土地革命，以及严惩了作恶多端的土豪劣绅。这对全世界无产阶级来说是极其鼓舞和振奋人心的。相对于其他第三世界国家来说，尼泊尔革命不得不面对“三座大山”，他们的目的是推翻依附帝国主义的官僚资产阶级统治体系，赶走帝国主义势力，铲除半殖民主义制度。尼共（毛）运用了毛泽东闻名的“持久战”战略。在广大农村建立了革命根据地，并以农村包围城市为指导方针，夺取全国政权，建立起一个新民主主义共和国，并在此基础上逐步走上社会主义道路。他们的斗争也是世界革命的一部分。在最近的四年中，尼泊尔政府采取了反革命的镇压运动--约有超过1 000人被捕和牺牲。但是面对残酷的现实，尼泊尔的革命运动依旧在蓬勃发展，许多贫苦的农民在战斗中锻炼成为一名练习有素的优秀战士。尼泊尔人民军是在游击区内组建的，并深深的扎根于广大人民群众中。非凡是广大劳动妇女，在人民军中扮演了重要的角色。在革命根据地，象在尼泊尔西部的罗尔帕（R olpa)和汝库姆（Rukum）地区，地方反动势力和政府军警被人民军赶走，政府军甚至连日常巡逻都提心吊胆。面对全国风起云涌的人民革命，1 999年尼泊尔大选产生的科腊拉那政府束手无策，地位非常不稳固。记者在访问期间，正是尼共（毛）发动的第四个战略计划如火如荼进行之中，这次战争的目的是扩展根据地范围，发展人民军力量。人民军的作战经验现在已经非常熟练，而且游击区也扩大了。以下就是记者采访尼共（毛）总书记普里昌达
毛泽东同志在中国发动的无产阶级文化大革命也直接影响了尼泊尔，文化大革命深深鼓舞了青年共产主义者和广大群众。同时，我们也受到了印度纳萨尔派（印度主张通过农民武装斗争夺取政权的共产党人）革命运动的激励。这些原因促使在加帕（J hapa）地区的青年共产党人首先发动了一场反对党内修正主义路线的斗争，这就是以后重新建党进程的发端。与此同时，尼共的四大开幕，会议主要讨论了在尼泊尔开展武装斗争问题的议程。但是在重新组党和如何领导群众发动起义的问题上我们的政治路线还是不明朗。这个重大的意识形态和政治问题在文化大革命结束后争论了1 0年。我们党现在的领导层产生都是这场意识形态斗争的最终结果。
就在同一时刻，在我们党内还存在一场重大的两条路线的斗争。第一次是和拉马（Lama）派的斗争，我们果断与之右倾道路进行了不懈斗争。第二次是与达姆（D umdum)派以及M.B.辛（M.B. Singh）的折衷主义道路进行斗争。M.B.辛最终分裂了党，自己组建了一个修正主义的党。这些修正主义者始终以所谓的“折衷”性的“中派”自居，我们果断的和他们进行了斗争。而我们的正确路线是最终在同修正主义路线的斗争和人民战争中发展起来的。在与M .B.辛的斗争中，我们进一步阐明了马克思列宁毛泽东主义的正确观点。
当我们草拟了运动的发动计划后，党内又爆发了一场关于如何开展人民战争的争论。与此同时，我们也间接地参与了国会选举活动，有11 名党员进入了国会。9名在众议院，2名在上议院。这在我们党内引起了强烈反应。这也是右倾势力对我们的一次大的挑战。为了使党的思想再一次飞跃，我们同修正主义，小资产阶级机会主义以及种种右倾思潮做了果断的斗争。关于许多同志是否公开身份进行工作的问题上，我强调了以下几个观点。我们1 1名进入国会工作的同志可以公开身份，而我们主要的政治局委员以及地方和地区上的领导同志绝不能公开身份。除了负责国会工作的机构外，其它党的组织一律转入地下。
Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World
Inside the Revolution in Nepal:
Interview with Comrade Prachanda
RW reporter Li Onesto interviews Comrade Prachanda, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Revolutionary Worker #1043, February 20, 2000
"We are fully conscious that this war to break the shackles of thousands of years of slavery and to establish a New Democratic state will be quite uphill, full of twists and turns and of a protracted nature. But this and this alone is the path of people’<$>s liberation and a great and bright future.”
From the leaflet distributed by the CPN (Maoist),
in hundreds of thousands of copies, all over Nepal
on February 13, 1996
Four years ago, on February 13, 1996, a new people’s war was initiated in Nepal under the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). In the first two weeks, almost 5,000 actions were carried out throughout the country — including armed assaults on police stations in rural districts, confiscation of property from oppressive landlords, and punishment of local tyrants. This was truly an inspiring and significant development in the world and for the international proletariat. As in other Third World countries, the revolutionaries in Nepal must confront “three mountains” to achieve liberation: Their goals are to overthrow the bureaucrat-capitalist class and state system, which are dependent on and serve imperialism; uproot semi-feudalism; and drive out imperialism. To do this, the CPN (Maoist) is applying Mao’s strategy of a protracted people’s war — establishing base areas in the countryside and aiming to surround the cities, seize nationwide power, and establish a new democratic republic as a step toward building a new socialist society. Their struggle is part of the world proletarian revolution. For the last four years, the government of Nepal has carried out vicious counter-revolutionary campaigns against the People’s War — over 1,000 people have already been killed and many more have been arrested, jailed, and tortured. But in the face of this, the revolution has continued to advance and grow. The People’s War in Nepal has advanced from primitive fighter groups to disciplined and trained squads and platoons. The people’s army has established guerrilla zones and is sinking deep roots among the people. Women continue to play a major role as fighters in the people’s army. And in areas where the People’s War is the strongest — like the Rolpa and Rukum districts in the West — local reactionaries have run away and the police stay away, afraid to patrol. Elected in May 1999, the government of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai has been unstable and fraught with in-fighting over how to deal with the insurgency. In the spring of 1999, RW reporter Li Onesto traveled throughout Nepal with the people’s army — meeting and talking with party leaders, guerrillas, activists in mass organizations and villagers. At that time, the CPN (Maoist) was in the process of leading the people to carry out their fourth military plan, aimed at establishing base areas and exercising new people’s power. Military actions by the guerrillas were becoming larger and more sophisticated. The following interview with Comrade Prachanda, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), was conducted during Li Onesto’s trip.
Li Onesto, Revolutionary Worker: There are revolutionary people all over the world who want to hear about the People's War in Nepal. So it would be of great interest if you could give a basic picture of the objective situation and what the material basis in Nepal is for initiating People's War. Why does the party think it is possible to wage protracted People's War, to organize the masses through armed struggle? Why is this the correct strategy given the situation in Nepal? And why does the party feel it is possible to win with this strategy?
Comrade Prachanda: First of all, I want to explain this question in ideological terms. Nepal is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. And MLM (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) says that in oppressed countries like this, semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries, in general, a revolutionary objective situation prevails. This is the ideological basis from where we started to study the concrete situation, because the main thing is ideological clarity. And through the course of class struggle, mass movements, mass struggle, and mainly the ideological struggle inside the communist movement, we came to the conclusion that a situation prevails for initiating the People's War.
We see that Nepal is a small and poor country. More than 85 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, and the people are very poor-they are very oppressed. The feudal relations-the feudal forms of exploitation-are very severe in the rural areas. Industrial development is very poor, and the kinds of industrial bases that are there are all in the hands of a comprador bourgeois class-mainly the Indian expansionist bourgeoisie. Therefore, there are sharp class distinctions, and people have been struggling for reforms, for independence, and for the livelihood of the people, for a long time. There has been continuous mass struggle. But due to the lack of revolutionary leadership, due to revisionism in the communist movement, due to a crisis of leadership: every time when there has been mass struggle, this leadership has been able to confuse the masses, to make compromises with the ruling classes and to get some concessions for this revisionist group.
I want to mention that in 1815 there was a big struggle with British India. Nepalese people fought heroically against British India but ultimately they did not succeed-they failed. This was armed struggle, this war with British India, and people participated in this war in different ways. Different kinds of guerrilla warfare were used. And, in that war, the British ruling class saw that the Nepalese people were very heroic and brave-and that they fought heroically against British India. For more than one year they fought and fought, and in many places they defeated the British army. Hundreds and hundreds of masses, including women and old men, all fought in that war. But the Nepalese ruling class, mainly the monarchy, the king, surrendered to India.
There was a negotiation in Sugali, and they made a compromise. And after that, more Nepalese territory was taken by India. Before this, geographically, Nepal was more or less three times larger. But all this land was taken by India with the Sugali Treaty. From that very point Nepal became a semi-colonial country, and when the British left India, Nepal became a semi-colony of Indian expansionism. After that, there came the Rana government clique, and the great comrade Karl Marx called this Jang Bahadur Rana a British puppet and dog. People suffered very much from different kinds of oppression and exploitation, and from that point, Nepal changed to a semi-feudal country.
In 1949 when the Nepalese Communist Party was established, it was a great and far-reaching historical event. That party was established when the great Chinese revolution had been won and socialism was developing in the USSR.
RW: Was the victory of the Chinese revolution a big factor in the establishment of the Communist Party in Nepal?
Prachanda: Yes, a very big factor. And there was also, at the time, a very big armed struggle of the peasants in India. This was the surrounding larger revolutionary situation at the time when the Communist Party in Nepal was established. The party started to work among the basic peasant masses, and for three or four years, there was a big peasant movement-a kind of revolutionary upsurge. But, at the same time, the leadership of the party changed and took a revisionist stand. And the leadership of the movement, the general secretary at the time, appealed to the king, saying we will do all our work peacefully, therefore please regard our party like this. And the party leadership totally went revisionist. After that there were so many mass struggles, mass movements. But every time, this revisionist clique confused people, made compromises with the ruling class, and betrayed the masses. Every time they betrayed the masses. And at the same time there was also ideological struggle going on inside the movement.
Then, when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was initiated in China under the leadership of great comrade Mao, it directly impacted on the revolution in Nepal. There were so many materials from the Chinese Cultural Revolution that came to Nepal. This Cultural Revolution inspired mainly the younger generation of communists and the masses. And at the same time young people in the communist movement were also inspired by the Naxalite Movement in India. This inspired young people in the Jhapa District and provoked a kind of rebellion against the revisionist leadership; and there was a process of reconstitution of the party. At the same time the Fourth Party Congress was held, and it also put the question of armed struggle on the agenda. But a fully developed political line was still not clear-of how to reorganize a new kind of party and explain to the masses the need to rebel. There was a big ideological and political debate for 10 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and all our leadership team is a product of that ideological struggle.
And at the same time, inside our party, there was a big two-line struggle, first with this Lama clique, because a rightist tendency was there. We fought vigorously with that line. Later on we fought with this Dumdum line, M.B. Singh's line, because it was eclecticism and rightism and very much muddle-headed. Individually M.B. Singh was established as a leader, but his line was totally revisionist, and it was so confusing, covered with eclectic words. We fought with that line, and, when we fought with that line, we developed the correct line which is now leading the people and the People's War. We came to an understanding from that struggle with Dumdum (M.B. Singh), and we defined our ideology as Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
RW: What year is this now you're talking about?
Prachanda: It was 1986, I think, when we finalized Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as our ideology. At the time, only the Communist Party of Peru had said this, and we had some documents from the PCP. But on that question, already for four or five years, there had been some discussion about: Why Mao Tsetung Thought? Why not Maoism? That kind of discussion had been going on inside our party. We had a debate for one year to change this terminology and then the whole party adopted Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as our ideology. It was not only a change of terminology, it was our understanding of Mao's contribution. We also defined the People's War and our military line, our political line. And this is our ideological, political, subjective basis. At the same time, class struggle was developing, and, in the circumstances of that class struggle and the two-line struggle, we were able to see the objective and subjective situation to initiate the People's War.
On your question about the relationship between objective and subjective factors, I want to say that in oppressed countries, according to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, a revolutionary objective situation generally prevails in one or another part of the country. The developing process of this country is uneven. Therefore, in any part of the country there is the possibility of initiating armed struggle and then sustaining and developing the struggle. In general, as a whole, you can say that an objective revolutionary situation prevails. In oppressed countries, the question is the subjective preparation-the main question, the principal factor is subjective. And subjective means the communist party, the revolutionary communist party, armed with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. We can also say, in this way, that the main question in these types of countries is how to fight against revisionism and build a new type of party armed with MLM. This is the principal question in these countries.
In imperialist countries this is not the case. In the imperialist countries, the principal question is not the subjective factor. The principal factor deciding tactics and line is objective. Objectively the imperialist countries suck the blood of the oppressed countries and control them. Therefore, the main question for revolutionaries in those imperialist countries is to continuously expose the whole system and build the party and make continuous preparation and consciously try to make the objective situation a revolutionary one-and when a revolutionary objective situation develops, at that time, deal a big blow. We think this kind of line should be applied there.
But the strategy is different in semi-feudal, semi-colonial countries like Nepal, where more than 80 to 85 percent of the population live in the rural areas, whose developing process is uneven, where the modern workers, proletarian workers, are very limited. Some people say a revolutionary objective situation does not prevail in these types of countries. Just like in our country, the revisionists always say the objective situation is not there, and they also say the subjective situation is not there to start the armed struggle. They always say this, and we condemn this line. This is not a fact. In these types of countries the question is subjective preparation. It was in this way that we looked at the conditions for initiating People's War.
And at the time of initiation, we tried to figure out the whole history of Nepal. What is the cultural standard, the cultural level of the masses, what are the economic conditions, what are the social relations, what are the forces, what is the class analysis? We did all these things before this last final preparation. And at that time we found some specific characteristics of the situation in Nepal. Although Nepal is a small country, we think, in another sense it is not a small country. Geographically when you look at the whole country of India you can travel in one or two days to every part and corner. But in Nepal you have to walk up and down for many days-I know you understand this. It is more remote than America.
RW: Yes, I have some direct experience with this!
Prachanda: Therefore, while Nepal is a small country, the mountainous region is very favorable for guerrilla warfare, for People's War. And we also saw that because there has been a centralized reactionary government for more than 200 years there has also been a tendency for the masses to resist throughout all of Nepal. The centralized government has its guns and control everywhere-controlled from Kathmandu. And in the long process of resistance and struggle, the Nepalese masses have developed a kind of situation where-from east to west, from north to south-everywhere there is mass, class struggle. So we saw a situation in which if we call for a program of resistance, of mass movement, then all of Nepal will engage in that movement.
We also looked at the fact that we are surrounded on three sides by this big Indian country. On the east, the west, the south, there is India. And on the north side, there is China. On the north side it is very difficult to come and go. The Himalayan Range is there. There are some places where people can go to and from Tibet, but in general it is not like it is with India. We also analyzed this situation.
We also found that Nepal is again a big country because there are so many nationalities. The population is only 20 million, but there are, more or less, 20 to 25 different oppressed nationalities. There are different languages, there are different religions. And this is also a particularity of the Nepalese situation. We studied all these questions and how to solve the nationality question. We fundamentally depart from all the revisionist and bourgeois parties. We uphold the right of self-determination for the oppressed nationalities, and, for now, in our concrete situation, we say that autonomy should be the program. We express this and explain this as a specific situation in our movement.
And in the Terai region-again you can say Nepal is "big" because you can see that in the southern part from east to west there is plains land, Terai land, which is more or less 300 meters from sea level. It is a big plain, a big agrarian area, with big forests. There is also the mountainous region, where there are big mountains-this is where you traveled, so you know exactly about this. And the majority of the population live in these mountainous areas and the big Himalayan Range, which is very cold. In this way you can also say Nepal is a big country, not a small country. We studied these geographical conditions.
And we also studied our subjective organizational situation. We were in the Eastern Region, we were in the Central and Middle Region, and we were also in the Western Region. The West is historically, geographically, and culturally the basin of the revolution. It is the main point for the revolution-the people here are more oppressed by the ruling classes, and the government in Kathmandu is very far from there.
RW: What is the material basis for the revolution being more advanced in the West? Is the question of the oppressed nationalities a big factor?
Prachanda: Yes, and one thing is that economically the ruling class always neglects the development of the West.
Prachanda: Because they think that to invest there will not be profitable. This is one factor we can see. And the other is that there are mainly oppressed nationalities there in the West and the ruling class is hegemonistic, chauvinistic-upper caste chauvinistic. Therefore they neglect and oppress these nationalities.
And the other thing is that in the time of making this country, before 1800, in the last part of the 18th century, at that time, this part of the country was not totally captured by the central government. There was a kind of compromise. With the Gorkha empire, this part of the country was captured later on. First they took the east side, later on they went on the west side. The main point here is not first or later. The main point is that those areas were not totally captured. The local authorities had some power and the central authorities had some power. In this way these areas had some kind of autonomy at that time.
So the masses of the Western Region were not so much in the control of the ruling government. And they did not care what the government did and didn't do. This is another historical fact about the West. And in western Nepal there are the Mongolian ethnic groups-you saw how all our comrades there look Chinese. These nationalities are so sincere and such brave fighters-historically they have had this kind of culture. And upper caste chauvinism and feudal ties do not prevail in these nationalities.
RW: You're saying feudal traditions are weaker among these oppressed nationalities?
Prachanda: Yes, weaker. Really. When you went to the Middle Region or the Eastern Region you saw that feudal traditions are very strong.
RW: But when I was in Rolpa and Rukum I didn't see any temples.
Prachanda: Yes, in Rolpa and Rukum there are not too many temples, and in the family background in these nationalities, there is a kind of democracy, a primitive democracy. Even male domination in these places is weaker-it is not like in the dominating castes. And at the same time, our party has a long history of working in these areas, like in Thabang and Rolpa.
RW: And the revisionists in these areas are weaker?
Prachanda: Very weak. And there has been a continuation of consistent revolutionary leadership there. The revisionist influence in that area has always been weak, and the revolutionary tendency has prevailed. There are all these factors. Geographically, there are no transportation facilities, there is no electricity, and communication is also very weak for the ruling classes. All these factors led us to the conclusion that the West is the main region for the People's War. But we also saw that we cannot initiate the People's War only in the western part, because the ruling class is very powerful. They have a powerful army, powerful communication system, and all these things. Therefore if we initiated armed struggle only in the western part, then the government would centralize all their forces and crush us.
Subjectively we also saw a favorable situation for developing mass movements all over the country. And we had organization throughout the whole country. Therefore we finalized that we should initiate People's War from different parts of the country. We should centralize in mainly three areas-East, Middle, West-and the capital. Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for propaganda and such things. And one other area where we should concentrate work is in India, because more than seven million Nepalese live in India. Therefore India should be the other point where we should make efforts to resist the ruling classes. In this way we made a plan. These are the specificities we saw in Nepal. We did not see the exact same situation and plan for initiating the armed struggle as in the Philippines, Peru, Turkey, and other countries where there is some kind of People's War. There are more similarities with the PCP in Peru, but not exactly. They initiated from one election booth, they attacked one election booth. But we initiated from different parts of the country-with thousands of actions in the first plan. When we studied in detail the historical, geographical, and cultural situation in Nepal, we came to the conclusion that we should initiate the People's War in this way.
More than 72 percent of the Nepalese people live below the poverty line. This is a grave situation. We have always explained to the people that nothing can be achieved from this multi-party system-that it is fake, it is imperialist, it is feudal. Therefore after three, four years, the masses saw that, "Yeah, what the Maoists have been saying is really correct." These kinds of sentiments prevailed. Just before the initiation we organized so many big mass demonstrations and mass meetings. Thousands and thousands of masses participated. We had already declared we are going to initiate the People's War. But the ruling class didn't believe it and thought, "These people are talking, only talking."
RW: In some of your writings you've talked about how the party had to make a big rupture-ideologically, politically and militarily-in order to initiate the People's War. This is a very big question for parties around the world, and it is a dividing line between revisionism and MLM-the question of actually carrying out the necessary ideological, political and organizational changes in the party, to initiate the armed struggle. So could you talk about the kind of ruptures your party had to make to initiate the People's War?
Prachanda: These are very serious, important questions you have raised. The question of rupture is a question of making a breakthrough. First of all there is the question of understanding our ideology, which means Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. How does Maoism explain or define this rupture, this developing process? Some people see a process of evolution, a process of continuous development, an evolutionary process. But Marxism-Leninism-Maoism teaches that this is not the case, this is not the scientific case, scientific analysis. The real process of development is breaking with continuation and making a rupture. Everything in nature, in human history and society, in human thinking-the process of development-is the process of breaking with continuation. We came to grasp this question very seriously before the initiation.
RW: You're talking about making a leap.
Prachanda: Yes, making a leap. At one point in our party, for every comrade, on the lip of every comrade was the question of leap, leap-we have to make a leap. We made this question of making a leap very sharp, that we have to make the leap. The revisionist parties and revisionist leaders always teach the people the question of reform, reform, reform. And reform is reformism, is revisionism. But the question of making leaps is revolutionary.
We condemn all the revisionist cliques as vulgar evolutionarism. We are revolutionary, and revolution means breaking with continuation and the question of making leaps. Before the initiation, we had a big debate on these questions. When we changed our terminology from "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought" to "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," at that point, we had a big debate inside the party on this question of leap. And we came to an understanding. Mao said in the theory of knowledge that there is a two-stage theory-the stage of sense or perception and the stage of logical conclusion. We tried to educate the whole party in Mao's theory of knowledge, this two-stage theory. And this gave us a new understanding of MLM. Before that, there was some kind of thinking that MLM meant different kinds of reforms and gradualism. But when we defined this question in this new way, then new feelings, new confidence, a new situation developed inside the party. There was a struggle with rightist tendencies at that time, and we fought, mainly with rightists, revisionism.
Then, when the plan for initiation was drawn up, there was another debate over questions of how to initiate People's War. Our party was so much influenced by rightist tendencies. At the same time, we had indirectly participated in the elections, and we had 11 members in the parliament, nine in the lower house and two in the upper house. And that also had a big influence inside our party circles-the rightist influence was there. That was a big challenge for our party, how to make a leap. The party was so much encircled by rightist revisionism, petty bourgeois tendencies, all these things. And many people were working openly. Although I want to mention and give more stress to the fact that our main leadership team was not working openly at that time. There were our MPs (members in the parliament) who were public. But our main PBMs (polit-bureau members) and comrades and main regional leaders and main district leaders were not open, they were underground. There was parliamentary work but the main party organizational mechanism was underground at that time-you should note this.
So in making the plan for initiation there was great debate over how to go to the armed struggle because many people were influenced by "peaceful" struggle, work in the parliament, rightist and petty bourgeois feelings, and a long tradition of the reformist movement. Then we said that the only process must be a big push, big leap. Not gradual change. There was some thinking from different people in the party that first we should do some actions without declaring the People's War, and then see what happens. This kind of thinking was also there among some people. And we discussed, is this the process? And we said-no, this is not revolutionary, this is also reformism. It is a conspiratorial approach. And armed struggle is not a conspiracy, People's War is not a conspiracy-it is open, politically open and declared openly. This conspiracy theory will not work, and it is also not revolutionary. Doing one action then saying, "OK, let's see what will happen." Then doing another action... No, nothing will work like this.
There was also some thinking that we could start armed struggle in different parts of the country but not say we had initiated the war-and then later on, when we see how the situation develops, we could declare People's War. This kind of logic was also there. And some sections wanted to initiate the war but wanted to still participate in the parliamentary system in an independent way. They argued that some people should still be in the parliament, that it would "help." Later, some of these types of people didn't exactly degenerate but politically retreated after the initiation. They had the logic that, "OK, we will initiate People's War, but in the main region, in Rolpa, Rukum, four MPs should be in parliament because we can win there and this will give strength to the People's War." That kind of logic was also there. And we condemned all this logic and, said, no, this is not Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.