尼联共（毛）党内的斗争进入白热化

南亚星火 尼泊尔革命
1

Upsurge in the Struggle in The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
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This Article first published on NEXT STEP from Nepal and is re-published on Democracy and Class Struggle.

(We have got this article through our friend Prem Pathak from Holland. Thanks to Prem Pathak and N.G. Rajaretnam for making this article available. We all know, Nepalese revolution is at the crossroads and the revolutionaries within the UCPN ( Maoist) are fighting against the revisionists. It is our strong confidence that revolutionary line will prevail over the counter-revolutionary line and we will be succeed to reorganize our party–a party of revolutionary spirit.

The decision by the Unified Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) chairman Prachanda and vice-chairman Baburam Bhattarai to hand over of the keys of the arms containers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments holding some of the weapons of the PLA soldiers in first week of September 2011 triggered a fresh round of internal Party struggle. Within a day, thousands upon thousands of people, including large numbers of Party members and its supporters gathered in the national capital, Kathmandu and several parts of the country to protest against the decision, holding night time flaming torch rallies amid very angry demonstrations.

The people saw the symbolic hand-over of the keys to a ‘special committee’ of the Constituent Assembly/parliament as a surrender of the revolution in Nepal.

Behind the ‘hand-over’ are issues over how the integration of the PLA with the Nepal Army (NA) would proceed. While a radical faction of the UCPN (Maoist) led by Baidya Poudal ‘Kiran’ wanted integration involving whole units, whether whole brigades or battalions with their chains of commands, ultimately responsible to the Party, another faction, led by Bhattarai has been willing to submit to what the Nepal Congress (NC) and the Communist Party Nepal (UML) had all along been demanding: induction of a very limited number of PLA fighters with the NA, and this, only on an individual basis, with the Maoist party giving up its leadership role of the PLA. The rest of the PLA soldiers would be ‘rehabilitated’, that is, given jobs as unarmed forest guards or security guards at industrial zones and installations.

[ 本帖最后由 submarine 于 2011-9-30 23:58 编辑 ]

2

The hand-over of the arms container keys signify the dissolution of the people’s army. It is a great departure from Mao tse-tung’s reminder, “Without a people’s army the people have nothing” and “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” It also signifies the capitulation of the revolution.

The deal struck with a united group of Madheshi parties by the Prachanda-Bhattarai factions of the UCPN (Maoist), apparently mediated by the Reasearch and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian intelligence service, enabled Bhattarai to be appointed as the Prime Minister. But it also was conditioned on the ‘integration and rehabilitation’ on the basis demanded by Nepal Army, NC and the UML as well as surrendering the keys of the arms containments.

Neither Prachanda nor Bhattarai had consulted or even informed vice-chairmen, Kiran and Narayan Kaji Shrestha and the Party Secretary and the Party’s in-charge for military affairs, Ram Bahadur Thapa ‘Badal’ on the decision to hand over the containers’ keys. It was decided in secrecy and carried out by stealth. Indeed, the Party Central Committee and Standing Committee had earlier rejected Prachanda’s proposal of the key-surrender.

Kiran and Badal protested the hand-over vehemently and called for public protest against this outrage.

It is crystal clear that the Prachanda-Bhattarai factions are now working as one party, colluding with the Indian state and the parties serving as political agents of foreign big capital. Bhattarai is even speaking of managing the dissent in the UCPN (Maoist). Left out of vital decision-making is the Kiran faction, now joined by Badal. It is a fact of life in the UCPN (Maoist) that there two distinct political centres with two diametrically opposed political lines and ideologies. Today, they are at logger heads.

Prachanda has, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, been utilising the existence of the PLA in the cantonments as a bargaining chip with his negotiations with other political parties (NC, UML and the Madheshi parties) ranged against the Maoists.

He has been using two very different tones and approaches. With the political parties of the reaction he has been seeking to appease them and reassure them that the Maoist Party would abide by the CPA and bring the peace-process to a conclusion and make drafting a new constitution as a matter of priority. To the Party cadre and to those who aspire revolutionary change for Nepal, he has been claiming that he sees that there is no option to the completion of the New Democratic Revolution through a people’s insurrection. Indeed, since the November, 2010 Palungtar Conference, he has even uttered that he will lead in turning the factories and student hostels into barracks.

3

With the elimination of the PLA factor now, he sees that he has rid himself of a lingering and persistent problem. He has won acceptability in Nepal’s parliamentary politics. He can now claim that he is a responsible politician of the republic as much as other politicians of the status quo.

But he has also lost an important means of negotiation for any meaningful change he might have intended to bring about through his leadership of the UCPN (Maoist).

It is well known that there have been three factions within the UCPN (Maoist) for sometime. One faction is led by Prachanda, the chairman himself. Another faction, following Bhattarai’s thinking, has spoken in favour of ‘capitalist development’ for Nepal. Its spokespeople and cadres openly advocate bringing changes through reforms within the constraints of electoral politics of the status quo, that is, within the semi-colonial, semi-feudal social relations plaguing Nepal.

The third faction, the Kiran faction is intend on continuing the revolution. This faction sees that the New Democratic Revolution is being betrayed by the current leadership and that though there are constant bickering and tension between the Bhattarai faction and the Prachanda faction over as to who should lead the government they are united in the general orientation of the UCPN (Maoist) and indeed the future direction along which the country should tread.

In 2010, around the Palungtar Conference of Party, Prachanda has been giving the impression that he has been vacillating between the two lines advocated by Kiran and that of Bhattarai, and that he was for Party unity, which he repeatedly stressed was paramount.

But in the face of stiff resistance by the NC, UML and other parties to his possible premiership of the country, Prachanda has come to realise that he has to give way to Bhattarai for the PM post. All the other political parties have made it clear that Prachanda is not acceptable to be the Prime Minister. And to defeat Kiran’s faction he saw that he must unite with Bhattarai.

4

Faced with growing dissent within his own party and stubborn refusal by his rivals in other parties, he chose to endorse Bhattarai as the next PM and has openly embraced his (Bhattarai’s) political line for the Party and the way ahead for the country. He has now thrown his lot with the Bhattarai faction.

The constant chant of the Prachanda-Bhattarai alliance today is the concluding of the peace-process and the drafting of a new (republican) constitution. This, even though they know very well, from their own experience, would be undermined and sabotaged all the way.

It is also well known that there has long been a two-line struggle within the UCPN (Maoist). This line struggle is a reflection of the class-struggle in Nepalese society and it has been simmering beneath the surface since 2006, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between seven parliamentary parties and the Maoists. This peace agreement ended ten years of revolutionary people’s war.

The struggle over the basic or general political line has to do with along which road or way the UCPN (Maoist) should go forward. A part of the Party wants to move ahead by participating in politics as usual, though under conditions of a republic instead of a monarchy, through an elected Constituent Assembly (CA) as well as a parliament. The purpose of the CA is to write a new, republican national constitution in place of the old feudal constitution and basically bring the peace-process to its culmination, that is, the integration of the PLA with the NA and carrying out a series of reforms through parliament or the CA.

Yet, another part of the Party wants a People’s Republic for the new Nepal. Its adherents and supporters see that the mere declaration of a republic in place of the kingdom would not make a new Nepal. They believe that life for the overwhelming majority of the people must take a turn for the better as promised by the revolutionaries at the outset of the protracted people’s war in 1996. This would mean fulfilling the promises of working-class power, an agrarian revolution for making possible the acquiring of land for the landless peasantry by the new power. The promise of a new Nepal would also include instituting a federal system whereby national autonomous regions can be mapped out.

Moreover, those who aspired to see a new Nepal yearned, and continue to yearn to see the beginning of the process of the ending of the age-old highly oppressive caste system, the practice of “untouchability” in particular, and the ending of the male-domination in society or patriarchy. Advocates of this line insist that without ending the dominance of and dependency on the big capitalists-bankers within Nepal and the ruling classes of India and beyond none of these can be realised, nor poverty made history. And hence, the revolution for a new Nepal – the overthrow of the present social system – must continue unceasingly; reforms through parliament can only serve to limit or obstruct such fundamental and far-reaching changes.

There has been developing open hostility between those upholding the two distinctly discernible political lines.

5

None of the goals set by the Maoist Party in 1996 has been realised till today. Positioning themselves for the scramble for posts and careers within the present social and political system by the cadres of the Prachanda-Bhattarai combine seems to take priority now. The tasks of forging the three instruments of the revolution (three magic weapons) – a revolutionary proletarian party, a people’s army and united front, put forth by Mao Tes-tung and Nepal’s revolutionaries is discarded by this leadership.

The two opposing political lines and the two diverging roads for a new Nepal are guided by very different world outlooks and ideologies.

In the years since the signing of the CPA, there has been a marked falling back of the ideology which once gave rise to a qualitatively new and vibrant revolutionary movement in South Asia. With the political expedience attendant in the process of unification with political parties claiming to adhere to Mao Tse-tung Thought, the leadership of Prachanda has obscured the clear distinction of its proletarian ideology. This was to facilitate the parties which opposed Maoism, and had hitherto opposed the people’s war, to join forces to form a grand Unified Communist Party (Maoist). Leaders from such parties have been accepted, since the peace-process to lead the UCPN (Maoist). On the other hand, many revolutionaries who participated in the people’s war, realising which way the Party is heading, became disgruntled and left to form other Maoist Parties.

There has also been a marked fall in the quality of the Party cadre and members even though the membership has swelled. Political opportunism and careerism are evident everywhere in the Party, and indeed corruption has reared its ugly head. These are all common knowledge. Increasingly the masses of the people who once looked up to the Maoists are becoming sceptical and even cynical towards them with each passing day.

More and more people in Nepal today are realising that if the rot is to be halted, the revolutionaries cannot hope to look to Prachanda and Bhattarai for guidance and leadership. The questions arise, can revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries co-exist in a single organisation? Dare the revolutionaries rise to the occasion and take the initiative?

People the world over, who hunger to witness the victory of a revolution led by a proletarian communist party to end all forms of oppression and exploitation want to see the revolutionary line prevail over the counter-revolutionary line in Nepal.

The recent protests and ferment within the UCPN (Maoist) give hope to those who are also venturing to bring a qualitatively better world.

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如果有志愿翻译关于这份尼泊尔素材的同志，请从第四第五篇开始，这样避免重复翻译，前三篇我尽快译出，如果时间充裕，再译出后两则。

8

Upsurge in the Struggle in The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

This Article first published on NEXT STEP from Nepal and is re-published on Democracy and Class Struggle.

We have got this article through our friend Prem Pathak from Holland. Thanks to Prem Pathak and N.G. Rajaretnam for making this article available. We all know, Nepalese revolution is at the crossroads and the revolutionaries within the UCPN ( Maoist) are fighting against the revisionists. It is our strong confidence that revolutionary line will prevail over the counter-revolutionary line and we will be succeed to reorganize our party–a party of revolutionary spirit.

The decision by the Unified Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) chairman Prachanda and vice-chairman Baburam Bhattarai to hand over of the keys of the arms containers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments holding some of the weapons of the PLA soldiers in first week of September 2011 triggered a fresh round of internal Party struggle. Within a day, thousands upon thousands of people, including large numbers of Party members and its supporters gathered in the national capital, Kathmandu and several parts of the country to protest against the decision, holding night time flaming torch rallies amid very angry demonstrations.

The people saw the symbolic hand-over of the keys to a ‘special committee’ of the Constituent Assembly/parliament as a surrender of the revolution in Nepal.

Behind the ‘hand-over’ are issues over how the integration of the PLA with the Nepal Army (NA) would proceed. While a radical faction of the UCPN (Maoist) led by Baidya Poudal ‘Kiran’ wanted integration involving whole units, whether whole brigades or battalions with their chains of commands, ultimately responsible to the Party, another faction, led by Bhattarai has been willing to submit to what the Nepal Congress (NC) and the Communist Party Nepal (UML) had all along been demanding: induction of a very limited number of PLA fighters with the NA, and this, only on an individual basis, with the Maoist party giving up its leadership role of the PLA. The rest of the PLA soldiers would be ‘rehabilitated’, that is, given jobs as unarmed forest guards or security guards at industrial zones and installations.

尼泊尔联合共产党（毛主义）党内斗争进入白热化
 本文首次发表在尼泊尔的《下一步》上，并于《民主与阶级斗争》上再次发布。
我们通过荷兰友人Prem Pathak获得本文。感谢Prem Pathak 和N.G. Rajaretnam提供本文。众所周知，尼泊尔革命正处于十字路口，尼联共（毛）内部的革命者正与修正主义分子做斗争。革命路线必将战胜反革命路线，这是我们坚定的信念。我们将会成功地重组我们的党——一个由革命精神武装的党。
尼联共（毛）主席普拉昌达和副主席巴塔拉伊做出决定，于2011年9月的第一周在人民解放军（PLA）军营举行交出装有大量士兵们武器的集装箱钥匙的仪式，这个决定引发了新一轮的党内斗争。在一天之内，成千上万的人——包括大量的党员和党的支持者——聚集到首都，加德满都和该国其他一些地区抗议这项决定，在异常愤怒的示威中举行夜间燃烧火炬的集会。
尼泊尔人民将尼联共（毛）把钥匙交给制宪大会（议会）的“特别委员会”作为革命投降的象征。
交出钥匙之后，将面临人民解放军（PLA）与尼泊尔政府军（NA）的整合如何进行的问题。尼联共（毛）中以基兰为首的激进派想要从单位整体上进行整合，尼联共（毛）指挥体系内的部队，无论整旅或整营，都最终向党负责；与此同时，以巴塔拉伊为首的另一派却想愿意屈从尼泊尔大会党（NC）和尼泊尔共产党（UML）一贯的要求：仅将及其有限的人民解放军（PLA）战士并入尼泊尔政府军（NA），当然，这仅仅是从个体的基础上，同时尼联共（毛）放弃对人民解放军（PLA）的领导地位。其余的人民解放军(PLA)战士将被“复员”，即，被安排从事手无寸铁的护林员的工作，或在工业区或工业设施当保安。

[ 本帖最后由 左手的力量 于 2011-10-1 12:24 编辑 ]

9

The hand-over of the arms container keys signify the dissolution of the people’s army. It is a great departure from Mao tse-tung’s reminder, “Without a people’s army the people have nothing” and “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” It also signifies the capitulation of the revolution.

The deal struck with a united group of Madheshi parties by the Prachanda-Bhattarai factions of the UCPN (Maoist), apparently mediated by the Reasearch and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian intelligence service, enabled Bhattarai to be appointed as the Prime Minister. But it also was conditioned on the ‘integration and rehabilitation’ on the basis demanded by Nepal Army, NC and the UML as well as surrendering the keys of the arms containments.

Neither Prachanda nor Bhattarai had consulted or even informed vice-chairmen, Kiran and Narayan Kaji Shrestha and the Party Secretary and the Party’s in-charge for military affairs, Ram Bahadur Thapa ‘Badal’ on the decision to hand over the containers’ keys. It was decided in secrecy and carried out by stealth. Indeed, the Party Central Committee and Standing Committee had earlier rejected Prachanda’s proposal of the key-surrender.

Kiran and Badal protested the hand-over vehemently and called for public protest against this outrage.

It is crystal clear that the Prachanda-Bhattarai factions are now working as one party, colluding with the Indian state and the parties serving as political agents of foreign big capital. Bhattarai is even speaking of managing the dissent in the UCPN (Maoist). Left out of vital decision-making is the Kiran faction, now joined by Badal. It is a fact of life in the UCPN (Maoist) that there two distinct political centres with two diametrically opposed political lines and ideologies. Today, they are at logger heads.

Prachanda has, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, been utilising the existence of the PLA in the cantonments as a bargaining chip with his negotiations with other political parties (NC, UML and the Madheshi parties) ranged against the Maoists.

He has been using two very different tones and approaches. With the political parties of the reaction he has been seeking to appease them and reassure them that the Maoist Party would abide by the CPA and bring the peace-process to a conclusion and make drafting a new constitution as a matter of priority. To the Party cadre and to those who aspire revolutionary change for Nepal, he has been claiming that he sees that there is no option to the completion of the New Democratic Revolution through a people’s insurrection. Indeed, since the November, 2010 Palungtar Conference, he has even uttered that he will lead in turning the factories and student hostels into barracks.

交出武器集装箱钥匙，象征着这支人民军队的解散。这严重违背了毛泽东的提醒，“没有一个人民的军队，便没有人民的一切”及“枪杆子里面出政权”。这也象征着革命的投降。
印度智囊机构研究与分析中心（RAW）明确透露，这项由尼联共（毛）中普拉昌达——巴塔拉伊阵营制定的协议在Madheshi地区的各方中达成了一致，任命巴塔拉伊为总理。但条件是，这仍然要以尼泊尔政府军、尼泊尔大会党（NC）和联合马列（UML）的要求为基础，即“整编和遣散”，同时交出武器集装箱的钥匙。
无论是普拉昌达还是巴塔拉伊，在作出交出武器集装箱钥匙的决定时都没有向副主席基兰和Narayan Kaji Shrestha以及党的书记和党的军事指挥员Badal进行咨询，甚至没有通知。这是在秘密状态下决定并且暗中进行的。事实上，党的中央委员会和常务委员会在早些时候曾拒绝了普拉昌达交出钥匙的建议。
基兰和Badal强烈抗议交出钥匙，并且号召民众抗议这一暴行。
现在已经非常清晰，普拉昌达-巴塔拉伊派系正在作为一个党在工作，与印度国家和各方外国大资本集团的政治代理人相勾结。巴塔拉伊甚至扬言要处理尼联共（毛）内部中的异议。主要决策者基兰的阵营脱离了，现在Badal也加入了这一行列。尼联共（毛）中存在这样一个事实，有两种由截然不同的政治路线和意识形态组成的政治中心。今天，他们正处于针锋相对的状态。
自从2006年签署“全面和平协定”以来，普拉昌达一直利用人民解放军驻屯的存在，作为与反对毛派的其他政治派系（如尼泊尔大会党，联合马列及Madheshi各方）谈判的筹码。
他使用了两种截然不同的调子和方法。随着政党各方的反应，他一直寻求安慰他们，向他们保证，尼联共（毛）将遵守“全面和平协定”（CPA），实现和平进程，并将制定一部新的宪法作为首要事项。他对党的干部和那些渴望尼泊尔发生革命性变化的人说，他认为通过人民起义的方式来完成新民主主义革命是没有可能的。事实上，在2010年9月份的帕朗达会议上，他甚至声称要领导工厂和学生宿舍变成军营。

[ 本帖最后由 左手的力量 于 2011-10-1 12:29 编辑 ]

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With the elimination of the PLA factor now, he sees that he has rid himself of a lingering and persistent problem. He has won acceptability in Nepal’s parliamentary politics. He can now claim that he is a responsible politician of the republic as much as other politicians of the status quo.

But he has also lost an important means of negotiation for any meaningful change he might have intended to bring about through his leadership of the UCPN (Maoist).

It is well known that there have been three factions within the UCPN (Maoist) for sometime. One faction is led by Prachanda, the chairman himself. Another faction, following Bhattarai’s thinking, has spoken in favour of ‘capitalist development’ for Nepal. Its spokespeople and cadres openly advocate bringing changes through reforms within the constraints of electoral politics of the status quo, that is, within the semi-colonial, semi-feudal social relations plaguing Nepal.

The third faction, the Kiran faction is intend on continuing the revolution. This faction sees that the New Democratic Revolution is being betrayed by the current leadership and that though there are constant bickering and tension between the Bhattarai faction and the Prachanda faction over as to who should lead the government they are united in the general orientation of the UCPN (Maoist) and indeed the future direction along which the country should tread.

In 2010, around the Palungtar Conference of Party, Prachanda has been giving the impression that he has been vacillating between the two lines advocated by Kiran and that of Bhattarai, and that he was for Party unity, which he repeatedly stressed was paramount.

But in the face of stiff resistance by the NC, UML and other parties to his possible premiership of the country, Prachanda has come to realise that he has to give way to Bhattarai for the PM post. All the other political parties have made it clear that Prachanda is not acceptable to be the Prime Minister. And to defeat Kiran’s faction he saw that he must unite with Bhattarai.

现在随着解放军因素的消失，他认为，他已经使自己摆脱了一个挥之不去的和持久的麻烦。他已经在尼泊尔议会政治中赢得了认可。现在，他能以和其他一些政治家同样的身份声称，他是这个共和国负责任的政治家。
但是他也失去了一个谈判的重要手段，他也许曾打算通过他在尼联共（毛）中的领导地位带来一些有利的改变。
众所周知，在尼联共（毛）中长期存在着三个派别。一派以普拉昌达为首，他本身就是主席。另一派曾声称支持尼泊尔“发展资本主义”，他们追随巴塔拉伊的思想。它的发言人和领导干部公开主张在半殖民地半封建的社会关系束缚的尼泊尔，利用选举政治对政治家身份的约束，通过改良的手段带来变化。
第三派，基兰派主张继续革命。该派认为，新民主主义革命是被现任领导层出卖的。同时认为，尽管在谁来领导政府这一问题上，巴塔拉伊派系和普拉昌达派系之间存在不断的争吵和紧张，但他们在尼联共（毛）的基本方针和国家未来发展方向上是一致的。
在2010年，围绕党的帕朗塔会议，普拉昌达一直给人这样的印象：他在基兰和巴塔拉伊主张的两条路线之间犹豫不决、摇摆不定，以及他为了党的团结，反复强调团结的至关重要性。
但是面对尼泊尔大会党（NC）、联合马列（UML）和其他政党对他可能成为国家总理的强烈阻力，普拉昌达已经意识到他必须将总理职位让给巴塔拉伊了。所有其他的政党都明确表示，普拉昌达当总理是各方都不能接受的。同时为了击败基兰的阵营，他意识到必须与巴塔拉伊联合起来。

[ 本帖最后由 左手的力量 于 2011-10-1 12:34 编辑 ]

11

Faced with growing dissent within his own party and stubborn refusal by his rivals in other parties, he chose to endorse Bhattarai as the next PM and has openly embraced his (Bhattarai’s) political line for the Party and the way ahead for the country. He has now thrown his lot with the Bhattarai faction.

The constant chant of the Prachanda-Bhattarai alliance today is the concluding of the peace-process and the drafting of a new (republican) constitution. This, even though they know very well, from their own experience, would be undermined and sabotaged all the way.

It is also well known that there has long been a two-line struggle within the UCPN (Maoist). This line struggle is a reflection of the class-struggle in Nepalese society and it has been simmering beneath the surface since 2006, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between seven parliamentary parties and the Maoists. This peace agreement ended ten years of revolutionary people’s war.

The struggle over the basic or general political line has to do with along which road or way the UCPN (Maoist) should go forward. A part of the Party wants to move ahead by participating in politics as usual, though under conditions of a republic instead of a monarchy, through an elected Constituent Assembly (CA) as well as a parliament. The purpose of the CA is to write a new, republican national constitution in place of the old feudal constitution and basically bring the peace-process to its culmination, that is, the integration of the PLA with the NA and carrying out a series of reforms through parliament or the CA.

Yet, another part of the Party wants a People’s Republic for the new Nepal. Its adherents and supporters see that the mere declaration of a republic in place of the kingdom would not make a new Nepal. They believe that life for the overwhelming majority of the people must take a turn for the better as promised by the revolutionaries at the outset of the protracted people’s war in 1996. This would mean fulfilling the promises of working-class power, an agrarian revolution for making possible the acquiring of land for the landless peasantry by the new power. The promise of a new Nepal would also include instituting a federal system whereby national autonomous regions can be mapped out.

Moreover, those who aspired to see a new Nepal yearned, and continue to yearn to see the beginning of the process of the ending of the age-old highly oppressive caste system, the practice of “untouchability” in particular, and the ending of the male-domination in society or patriarchy. Advocates of this line insist that without ending the dominance of and dependency on the big capitalists-bankers within Nepal and the ruling classes of India and beyond none of these can be realised, nor poverty made history. And hence, the revolution for a new Nepal – the overthrow of the present social system – must continue unceasingly; reforms through parliament can only serve to limit or obstruct such fundamental and far-reaching changes.

There has been developing open hostility between those upholding the two distinctly discernible political lines.

面对日益增长的党内异议和其他党派政敌的顽固拒绝，他选择支持巴塔拉伊作为下任总理，他曾公开接受巴塔拉伊的政治路线作为党的路线和国家前进的道路。
今天的普拉昌达-巴塔拉伊联盟不断高唱和平进程和一个新的（共和党）章程的起草。尽管他们凭借自己的经验非常清楚地知道，这将动摇和破坏整个前途。
大家都知道，尼联共（毛）内部存在两条路线的斗争。这种路线斗争，是尼泊尔社会中阶级斗争的反映，自2006年尼联共（毛）与七个议会政党签署“全面和平协定”（CPA）以来，它已经在表面之下暗流涌动。这项所谓“和平协定”葬送了十年人民革命战争。
这种高于基层和一般性政治路线之上的斗争，关系到尼联共（毛）将沿着什么样的道路或方式前进。党内一部分人想要通过像往常一样参与政治的方式前进，尽管前提条件是以一个共和国代替君主，通过选举产生的制宪大会（CA）和议会。制宪大会（CA）的意图是起草一部新的、共和性质的国家宪法代替旧的封建宪法，并最终从根本上实现和平进程，即整编人民解放军（PLA）和尼泊尔政府军（NA），并通过制宪大会（CA）和议会实行一系列的改革。
然而，党内的其他人，希望建立一个新尼泊尔人民共和国。其追随者和支持者认为，仅仅一纸关于以共和国取代王国的宣言并不能使尼泊尔获得新生。他们认为，为了最广大人民群众更好地生存，作为革命者们在长期人民战争开端的1996年时的承诺， 必须采取转变措施。这将意味着工人阶级政权履行承诺，通过新政权进行土地革命，使无地农民获得土地成为可能。一个新尼泊尔的承诺，也包括实行联邦制度，民族自治区域也可以由此获得体现。
另外，那些渴望看到一个新的尼泊尔的人们，更进一步地渴望看到年代久远的高度压迫的种姓等级制度的终结进程的曙光，尤其是对“不可触者”（译者注：即尼泊尔种姓制度所造成的“贱民”）的改善和终结男权社会或父权制。这条路线的倡导者坚持认为，如果不结束尼泊尔大资本家、大银行家和印度统治阶级的主宰和对他们的依赖并且超越他们，那么前面提到的一切都不可能实现，更不谈让贫穷成为历史了。因此，为了一个新尼泊尔的革命——推翻目前的社会制度——必须坚持不懈；通过议会进行的改良，只会起到限制和阻碍根本性的和影响深远的变革的作用。
现在坚持两条明显不同的政治路线的人之间已经形成了公开的斗争。

12

None of the goals set by the Maoist Party in 1996 has been realised till today. Positioning themselves for the scramble for posts and careers within the present social and political system by the cadres of the Prachanda-Bhattarai combine seems to take priority now. The tasks of forging the three instruments of the revolution (three magic weapons) – a revolutionary proletarian party, a people’s army and united front, put forth by Mao Tes-tung and Nepal’s revolutionaries is discarded by this leadership.

The two opposing political lines and the two diverging roads for a new Nepal are guided by very different world outlooks and ideologies.

In the years since the signing of the CPA, there has been a marked falling back of the ideology which once gave rise to a qualitatively new and vibrant revolutionary movement in South Asia. With the political expedience attendant in the process of unification with political parties claiming to adhere to Mao Tse-tung Thought, the leadership of Prachanda has obscured the clear distinction of its proletarian ideology. This was to facilitate the parties which opposed Maoism, and had hitherto opposed the people’s war, to join forces to form a grand Unified Communist Party (Maoist). Leaders from such parties have been accepted, since the peace-process to lead the UCPN (Maoist). On the other hand, many revolutionaries who participated in the people’s war, realising which way the Party is heading, became disgruntled and left to form other Maoist Parties.

There has also been a marked fall in the quality of the Party cadre and members even though the membership has swelled. Political opportunism and careerism are evident everywhere in the Party, and indeed corruption has reared its ugly head. These are all common knowledge. Increasingly the masses of the people who once looked up to the Maoists are becoming sceptical and even cynical towards them with each passing day.

More and more people in Nepal today are realising that if the rot is to be halted, the revolutionaries cannot hope to look to Prachanda and Bhattarai for guidance and leadership. The questions arise, can revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries co-exist in a single organisation? Dare the revolutionaries rise to the occasion and take the initiative?

People the world over, who hunger to witness the victory of a revolution led by a proletarian communist party to end all forms of oppression and exploitation want to see the revolutionary line prevail over the counter-revolutionary line in Nepal.

The recent protests and ferment within the UCPN (Maoist) give hope to those who are also venturing to bring a qualitatively better world.
直到今天，毛主义党在1996年提出的目标还没有一个是已经实现了的。在当前由普拉昌达-巴塔拉伊派系主导的社会和政治体系中，将他们自己定位于争权夺利似乎成了优先选择。由毛泽东和尼泊尔本土革命者提出的锻造革命的三种手段的任务（三大法宝）——无产阶级革命政党，人民武装和统一战线，被现在的领导层抛弃了。
为了一个新的尼泊尔，这两条对立的政治路线和不同的道路正由两种不同的世界观和意识形态指导着。
自从“全面和平协定”（CPA）签署以来的几年中，曾经在南亚给人们带来新的质量和充满生机活力的革命运动的意识形态发生了显著的衰落。随着在与宣称追随毛泽东思想的其他政党的联合进程中政治利益的出现，领导者普拉昌达使了无产阶级思想的明确区分变得模糊。这是为了方便反对毛主义并且至今反对人民战争的其他党派，加入进来联手建立一个大的联合共产党（毛主义）。由于尼联共（毛）受和平进程的左右，来自这些党派的一些领导人已经被尼联共（毛）接受。另一方面，许多参加人民战争的革命者意识到这个党正处的方向，开始新生不满，并且离开该党去建立新的毛主义党组织。
在党的干部和成员的质量上，也呈现了明显的滑坡，尽管党员基数膨胀了很多。在党内随处可见政治投机分子和野心家，的确，腐败已经开始抬头。这些都是常识。越来越多的曾经憧憬毛主义的人开始质疑，甚至对他们的改头换面冷嘲热讽。
在尼泊尔，越来越多的人已经意识到，如果想要停止腐败，革命者们不能指望向普拉昌达和巴塔拉伊寻求指挥和领导。问题出现了：革命者和反革命分子能共存于同一个组织吗？革命者敢于挺身而出并争取主动吗？
世界各地的人们——那些渴望见证无产阶级共产党领导的结束一切形式的压迫与剥削的革命胜利的人们——希望看到尼泊尔的革命路线战胜反革命路线。
最近尼联共（毛）内部出现的抗议和骚动，给那些正在冒着风险去争取一个翻天覆地的新世界的人们带来了希望。

13

非常感谢 左手的力量