一场革命还是一次政变？
来源：社会主义工人网（英国） 作者：亚历山大·卡林尼科斯
1917年俄国十月革命后，列昂?托洛茨基立即在他的回忆录里写道，列宁用德语对他说“Es schwindelt”——“这让人头晕。”
近几个星期所发生的事情会让许多人头晕，不管是对革命者而言还是对非革命者而言。从默罕穆德?布瓦吉吉自杀到2月14日突尼斯群众推翻本?阿里的独裁统治，时间仅仅过了一个月。
2个半星期后，另一个更强大的暴君，胡斯尼?穆巴拉克，因大量的的抗议被迫离开了埃及。但是这改变了多少呢？很少，现实的帝国主义者，战略情报网的乔治?弗里德曼说: “这不是革命。抗议者并没有让穆巴拉克下台，更不用说政权了。这是一场军事政变，他们以示威者要求穆巴拉克下台来作为掩盖从而维持政权。
“当2月10日穆巴拉克表示不会主动下台，军队发动了一场政变促使穆巴拉克辞职。”
对弗里德曼来说，埃及革命只是一个插曲，帮助军队解决了与穆巴拉克的冲突，即他意图让儿子伽马尔成为他的继承人。
现在来看这个分析并不完全是错的。它强调的是，即使穆巴拉克离开了，他掌握的这个政权会依然存在。更为要命的是，埃及政权的核心——他的暴力机关——依然存在。
中央安保部队可能已经因为1月28日的巷战筋疲力尽了，但毫无疑问军队却不是。
当然，将军们在上周五的行动会很可能是为了维护整个军队。他们对征召兵和一般职员的忠诚保持有所顾虑，因为那些人曾都与抗议者们有过良好交往。
在1978到1979年的伊朗革命中，正是由于几个月的血腥的抗议和罢工所累积的影响，军队的团结性降低、士气下降，沙阿王朝最终破灭。
穆巴拉克对权力的固执也导致了这样一个结果。因此美国和军队无情的推翻了他。
但是为了推翻穆巴拉克，又把政权夺到自己手中来，将军们把自己推到了舞台中央。
武装部队最高委员会的出现让人想起了革命指挥委员会——1952年伽马尔?阿卜杜尔?纳赛尔统治埃及时建立的军政府。
但是最高委员会的领头，默罕穆德?坦塔维不是纳赛尔。由维基解密公布的美国大使馆电报引用了这样一句话：“人们会听到开罗国防部中层官员公开鄙视坦塔维的声音，这些官员说坦塔维是穆巴拉克的走狗。
这些证据强调了军政府会努力维持现状。但这又让我们觉得这和弗里德曼的分析是错误的。
不管穆巴拉克和军队之间有多少冲突，是遍布整个埃及的群众自己组织了起来才迫使将军们行动。
现在军队正努力让事态恢复正常。这不是件容易的事情。这些天来罢工运动的扩展成了导致穆巴拉克下台的决定性因素之一。
这并不突然——过去这些年见证了自1940年代以来埃及工人的斗争。
我们现在所看到的发展是经济和政治斗争的相互作用，就如同罗莎·卢森堡在俄国1905年革命所分析的一样。
政治上的胜利可能会鼓励工人们对经济上的不满而战斗，而这会让工人以主人翁的身份驾驭这场斗争。总而言之，这些斗争会强化推翻现有政权的政治运动。
埃及革命还远未结束。
Is this a revolution or just a coup?
Source: Socialist Worker by Alex Callinicos
Leon Trotsky recalls in his memoirs that, immediately after the Russian Revolution of October 1917, Lenin said to him in German, “Es schwindelt”—“It makes one dizzy.”
The last few weeks has made plenty of people dizzy, revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries alike. It took just under a month from the suicide of Mohamed Boazizi for the Tunisian masses to bring down the dictatorship of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January.
Two and half weeks later an even mightier tyrant, Hosni Mubarak, was forced out by mass protests in Egypt. But how much has changed? Very little, claims the voice of imperialist realism, George Friedman of the strategic intelligence website Stratfor: “What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime.
“When it became clear Feb 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation.”
For Friedman, the Egyptian revolution is nothing more than an episode that allowed the military to resolve its conflict with Mubarak over his attempt to install his son Gamal as his successor.
Now this analysis isn’t completely false. It underlines that, even if Mubarak has gone, the regime over which he presided continues to exist. More fundamentally, the core of the Egyptian state—its repressive apparatuses—survives.
The Central Security Force may have been shattered by the street battles on 28 January, but the army definitely wasn’t.
Indeed, one reason why the generals acted on Friday of last week may well have been to preserve the army intact. They may have been worried about retaining the loyalty of their conscript troops and junior officers, many of whom had been fraternising with the protesters.
What broke the Shah’s regime during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 was the cumulative effect of months of bloody protests and strikes that wore down the cohesion and morale of the army.
Mubarak’s stubborn clinging to power conjured up such a scenario. Hence the ruthlessness with which the US and the military dumped him.
But in forcing him out and assuming power themselves, the generals have put themselves centre-stage.
The appearance of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces recalls bodies like the Command Council of the Revolution, the military junta through which Gamal Abdul Nasser ruled Egypt after 1952.
But Mohammed Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council, is no Nasser. A US embassy cable published by Wikileaks quotes a source saying “one can hear mid-level officers at [Ministry of Defence] clubs around Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers refer to Tantawi as ‘Mubarak’s poodle’, he said.”
This evidence underlines that the military junta will strive to preserve the status quo. But this then brings us to what is wrong with Friedman’s analysis.
However much friction there may have been between Mubarak and the army, it was the self-organised masses throughout Egypt who forced the generals to act.
Now the military is striving to get the genie back into the bottle. This may not be so easy. One of the decisive developments in the days leading up to Mubarak’s fall was the spreading strike movement.
This didn’t come out of the blue—the past few years have seen the biggest wave of workers’ struggles in Egypt since the 1940s.
What we may well see now develop is the kind of interaction between economic and political struggles that Rosa Luxemburg analysed during the Russian Revolution of 1905.
Their political victory may encourage workers to demand satisfaction for the economic grievances that helped to drive the revolt in the first place. And these struggles can strengthen the political movement to get rid of the regime altogether.
The Egyptian revolution is far from over.
[ 本帖最后由 萨马拉 于 2011-3-1 23:09 编辑 ]